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Abstract
The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) has refined a process to ensure a comprehensive and
complete DSAlTSR change implementation. Successful Nuclear Facility Safety Basis
implementation is essential to avoid creating a Potential Inadequacy in Safety Analysis (PISA)
situation, or implementing a facility into a non-compliance that can result in a TSR violation.
Once past initial implementation, additional changes to Documented Safety Analysis (DSA)
and Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) are often needed due to needed requirement
clarifications, operating experience indicating that ConditionslRequired Actions/Surveillance
Requirements could be improved, changes in facility conditions, or changes in facility mission
etc. An effective change implementation process is essential to ensuring compliance with 10
CFR 830.202(a), "The contractor responsible for a hazard category 1,2, or 3 DOE nuclear
facility must establish and maintain the safety basis for the facility."
Effectively Implementing Change
The PFP has developed a checklist driven process that is used to implement DSAlTSR change.
The process ensures that a complete package documenting readiness to implement is brought to
the Plant Review Committee for concurrence with readiness to implement actions before the
changes are implemented in the field.
Background
In 1994, the PFP was the first nuclear facility on the Hanford site to implement a DOE-Order
5480.22 compliant TSR document. A detailed readiness assessment-like process was used to
transition the facility from the pre-I 994 Operational Safety Requirements and into the 5480.22
compliant TSRs. The transition document provided a comprehensive and valuable "snapshot in
time" demonstrating implementation ofand compliance with the new TSRs. However, the
process for maintaining TSR compliance documentation and implementation of future Safety
Basis change was not well defined. From 1994 to 2004, three major PFP Final Safety Analysis
Report revisions and thirty-five TSR revisions were implemented using a process that was
generally documented on a single page checklist completed by a single person. This unrefined
Safety Basis change process resulted in numerous oversight and self identified Findings related
to requirement changes not being incorporated, or being inadequately/improperly incorporated,
into field-level compliance procedures. The unrefined process ultimately resulted in at least
one TSR violation.
Implementation Process Improvement
In response to the recognized change implementation short comings, Fluor Hanford established
the hnplementation Validation Review (IVR) process and issued a site wide procedure titled
"Safety Basis Implementation and Maintenance." The primary objectives of the IVR process
are to:
• Verify that the DSAlTSR controls and requirements are incorporated into facility
documents and work instructions;
• Verify that facility personnel are knowledgeable of DSAlTSR controls and
requirements; and
• Verify that DSAlTSR controls will be adequately implemented.
Essential elements of the Safety Basis hnplementation and Maintenance include
implementation plans, NR checklists, and compliance matrices.
Implementation Plans and IVR Checklists
The safety basis implementation plan provides a process to ensure the plant hardware,
management systems, and personnel are ready to implement the requirements of the safety
basis. It also includes the means to validate the implementation of the safety basis change prior
to its implementation/transition date. The plan helps to ensure the appropriate safety basis
supporting documents have been reviewed against the safety basis and all required changes to
these documents have been completed and are ready to issue. The IVR checklist provides for
documentation of the reviews that were performed to determine readiness to implement the
safety basis.
Compliance Matrices
The safety basis compliance matrix tracks commitments from the facility DSAlTSR and the
DOE-issued Safety Evaluation Report to their implementing procedures and processes. The
compliance matrix serves as a convenient document during facility performance assessment
activities and performance ofunreviewed safety question determinations.
The compliance matrix or matrices may be maintained as spread sheets, databases, or word
processor tables. All of these formats are workable. To be ofreal value, the compliance matrix
or matrices must be sufficiently detailed and maintained up-to-date. The compliance matrix is
the starting point in identifying documents affected by safety basis changes. The compliance
matrix oftentimes becomes the only comprehensive record ofdisposition of Safety Evaluation
Report Conditions of Approval (COA's) and/or technical direction.
PFP's Integrated Safety Basis Change Implementation PlanlIVR Checklist Process
PFP has chosen to integrate the safety basis change implementation plan, and the IVR checklist
into a single safety basis change process and document that satisfies the requirements ofthe
site Safety Basis Implementation and Maintenance procedure.
Essential Elements to Successful Change Implementation
Approximately three years ofrefining the safety basis change implementation process has
resulted in identification of a number of elements that are essential to successful change
implementation. These elements are:
~ Application of graded approach to the complexity of the implementation plan.
Fluor's Safety Basis Implementation and Maintenance procedure defines three levels of
safety basis change.
• Major Changes. Multiple changes, physical alterations of credited components, changes
in methods used to demonstrate operability of TSR controls. Major changes could
potentially affect the ability to comply with the safety basis or involve the
implementation ofa new safety basis.
A major change would typically involve a management readiness assessment like
review. The scope and contents of an implementation plan/IVR for a major change is
reviewed and approved by the Plant Review Committee.
• Moderate Changes. One or more complex changes or numerous changes to credited
controls or control parameters involving safety class or safety significant items or TSR
operating limits or administrative controls.
A moderate change typically requires at lease two individuals, one ofwhich should be
from an independent oversight organization (e.g., Quality Assurance). The scope and
contents of an implementation plan/IVR for a moderate change are also reviewed and
approved by the Plant Review Committee.
• Minor Changes. One or more simple changes to a credited control or control parameter
involving safety class or safety significant items or TSR operating limits or
administrative controls. This also includes the deletion of credited controls (e.g., as a
result of deactivation or decommissioning activities).
A minor change implementation is typically limited to review by two individuals
assigned by the project. The scope and contents of an implementation plan/IVR for a
minor change is approved by the facility Operations Director or delegate.
» Management ownership ofthe implementation process.
The facility manager is responsible for maintaining the safety basis. The facility manager or
delegate:
• Concurs with the assigned change level (i.e., Major, Moderate, Minor).
• Concurs with the scope ofand level ofdetail in the implementation planiNR. This
concurrence is delegated for minor changes.
• Assigns the individuals responsible for completing the implementation planINR.
• Assigns work priorities to organizations that have actions to complete within the
implementation plan.
» Early planning of scope/detail based on safety basis change level assignment.
Allow sufficient time to complete implementation actions. Completion of some actions,
such as training or equipment modifications, may take longer than originally anticipated
due to availability ofpersonnel (shift work, vacations, etc.).
• For major changes, implementation plan development should start concurrently with
facility approval of the safety basis and no later than upon submittal of the change
package to DOE for approval.
• For moderate changes, implementation plan development should start no later than
resolution ofany DOE review comments and drafting of the Safety Evaluation Report.
• For minor changes, implementation plan development typically starts upon receipt from
DOE of the change approving SER.
Reviews, Document Changes, and Other Actions to Include in the Implementation Plan
PFP's implementation plan process has identified numerous categories of reviews, document
changes, and other actions such as training and work planning that must be considered. These
include:
• Active Justifications for Continued Operation and open Unreviewed Safety Question
Determinations, Unreviewed Safety Question process categorical exclusions (CX's).
• Criticality Safety and Fire Hazard Analyses documents.
• Safety Basis compliance matrix or matrices.
• Operational aids such as status boards, shift orders, other operator aids, recovery plans.
• Engineering documents such as drawings, system description documents, operating
specification documents, safety equipment list.
• Work planning items such as job hazard analyses, work packages with affected
documents within or that involve affected equipment.
• Emergency preparedness documents such as the emergency preparedness hazards
assessment, building emergency plans, and other emergency response procedures.
• Administrative and technical procedures.
• Training to the safety basis change(s). This category includes a training needs analysis
to determine the scope/delivery of the training and the required audience, development
ofthe training package, delivery and documentation ofthe training, and evaluation of
any affected existing training packages (e.g., operator or engineer
training/qualification/certification modules) that require modification.
• Consulting with involved management and organizational groups to identify any "gaps"
in the implementation plan, such as additional documents that might not have been
identified for change.
• Post implementation punch lists and action tracking system entries for items that will
not be completed before declaration of readiness for change implementation.
• Log book entries to notifY responsible personnel when the implementation process is
entered, and then again when implementation readiness is declared and implementation
effective date.
• Assembling an "evidence book" of completed actions. This book is actually a three ring
binder containing copies of all completed documented changes, implementation plan
review comments, e-mails to others documenting requests to complete actions, replies
documenting completed actions, log book entries, completed training actions, etc.
• Obtaining concurrence from the Plant Review Committee on readiness to implement.
• Coordinating roll-out of the revised safety basis and affected documents. Some tasks
may need to include a "time out" or be deferred while obsolete procedures are removed
from the field or work package and replaced with ones updated to reflect the revised
safety basis.
• Verification that, after readiness declaration, all affected document changes are issued
in a timely manner.
Disposition of a Completed Implementation Plan
The completed implementation plan is issued as a controlled engineering document for records
retention purposes. Record copies ofthe documents that were changed as part of
implementation are retained as required by the site records management system. However, the
populated "evidence book" and a hard copy ofthe completed implementation plan are retained
in plant for easy future reference. These retained copies are especially useful when a safety
basis change such as a Justification for Continued Operation must be closed out or
"unimplemented".
Benefits from Using the Refined Safety Basis Change Implementation Process
As a direct result ofusing the refined safety basis change implementation plan/IVR process,
thePFPhas:
I. Reduced the number of oversight findings of documents not being current with the
approved safety basis.
2. Reduced the number of work packages and work procedures rendered unworkable due
to safety basis changes not being incorporated into them.
3. Improved safety basis change training delivery process. Target audiences requiring
training are identified through an analysis of training needs that are specific to change
packages.
4. Improved the accuracy ofcontinuing training packages by ensuring that they are
reviewed and revised to reflect safety basis changes.
5. Reduced the potential for safety basis change induced PISA's and TSR violations.
